




























Abstract  - In accordance with the concept of transaction as introduced by John R. Commons we will 
investigate the contractual and market remedies which labour law may implement to make ‘order’ in the 
employer-employee relationship.  
In this view, one of the most important contractual remedies is the minimum wage. It demarks an inalienable 
default point under which wage bargaining can not drop. Unlike, employability represents the most 
important concept in order to take into explicit account market dynamics. In this respect, employment 
compensation and public employment offices, involving parties’ outside options, are widely treated.  
Lastly, we will prove that these two kinds of legal intervention (contract and market regarding) are derived 
from Commons distinction between liberty and freedom.  
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Commons’ (1924, 1931, 1934, 1950) notion of transaction is one of the most 
important contributions of Institutionalism1. Accordingly, the transaction is 
composed of at least five parties: an agent, its competitor, its counterparty, 
its alternative counterparty and a fifth agent acting as public authority or 
jural enforcer2. In other words, two buyers, two sellers and the judge are the 
basic elements in Commons’ transaction. Therefore, in a transaction, each 
person ought to consider  
 
“the alternatives open to himself, the existence of actual, potential, possible 
or impossible rivals, and the degree of power which he can exert within the 
limits of these alternatives […] A transaction, then, involving a minimum of 
five persons, and not an isolated individual, nor even only two individuals, is 
the ultimate unit of economics, ethics and law. It is the ultimate but complex 
relationship, the social electrolysis, that makes possible the choice of 
opportunities, the exercise of power and the association of men into 
families, clans, nations, business, unions and other going concerns. The 
social unit is not an individual seeking his own pleasure: it is five individuals 
doing something to each other within the limits of working rules laid down 
by those who determine how disputes shall be decided”.  
Commons, 1924:67-69 
 
In this way individual actions are really trans-actions rather than individual 
behaviours or exchanges of commodities (Commons, 1931:652).  
 
Despite John R. Commons is considered one of the most important authors 
of the Old Institutionalism, the more recent literature on contractual 
                                                 
1 As Williamson (1985) recognizes, J. R. Commons was the first modern economist who 
defined a transaction as the minimal unit of analysis for institutional economics.  
2 Which guarantees a perfect fit between the entitlements of the different agents (see 
Pagano, 2002); see also (Bromley, 2006).   2
incompleteness, deriving from the New Institutional Economics 
(hereinafter NIE), dispenses many implications of the Commonsian notion 
of transaction (Nicita and Vatiero 2007a; 2007b). The limits of NIE’s 
theories of transactions and organizations mainly stem from the exclusive 
focus placed by NIE’s economists on bilateral bargaining and from the 
implicit assumption of considering relevant markets as if they are always in 
equilibrium, with parties’ exogenous outside options – at least during the 
period covered by parties’ contractual relationship. In particular, Coase 
(1937, 1960), Williamson (1985) and GHM3 seem to neglect the role played 
by third parties’ externalities on contractual enforcement. A transaction is 
mainly deemed as a bilateral transaction (between, say, a buyer and a seller) 
which needs, in order to be carried out, an appropriate enforcement 
structure when contracts are incomplete and assets are specific to some 
extent.  
This assumption is clear in Coase’s (1960) famous Rancher-Farmer example. 
The problem of an externality between the Rancher and the Farmer does 
not affect at all any other Rancher-Farmer relationship. Moreover, parties 
take prices in the market as given and external effects between them do not 
change the market price. The reason for that is the implicit assumption 
according to which, outside the specific relationship under investigation, the 
remaining world is characterized by perfect competition and, consequently, 
it is not possible for economic agents to influence other agent’s behaviour 
as well as the market price.  
 
Following Coase’s perspective, most of the theories on incomplete contracts 
are generally based on the assumption that agents’ outside options (i.e. the 
degree of market competition) are exogenously given4. Indeed, Williamson 
(1985) has confined his analysis to the case of a ‘fundamental 
transformation’, for which an ex-ante competitive transaction is ex-post 
transformed into a monopolistic one.  
In GHM, the level of ex-ante parties’ outside options acts as a default point 
in the ex-ante contracting and as a threat point in the ex-post bargaining 
over the joint surplus.  
                                                 
3 Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1990), and Hart (1995). 
4 Only some recent papers are explicitly concerned with investment decisions in a market 
environment, as  K. Chatterjee and Y. S. Chiu (1999) and de Meza and Lockwood (1998).    3
In both cases, according to the related literature, outside options are never 
affected by the investments made by parties. In other words, investment 
decisions are affected by the ex-ante market configuration, but they do not 
affect each agent’s ex-post competitors. The ‘market’ is implicitly supposed 
to be an equilibrium market and hence for contractual parties it is not possible 
to affect (and to be affected by) competitors’ strategies. Thus, in most of 
these analyses, ‘fundamental transformation’ acts only in one way: from 
market exchange to bilateral monopoly, whereas the opposite direction of 
causality is almost neglected.    
 
The main consequence of this approach i s  t h a t  o f  i d e a l l y  r e d u c i n g  t h e  
complex interactions among the several institutional domains exclusively to 
the voluntarily private orderings arrangements set by the parties in a bilateral 
contract. This partial equilibrium analysis, which is at the heart5 of the NIE, 
has had the merit of underlining the emergence of private orderings in the 
g o v e r n a n c e  o f  i n c o m p l e t e  c o n t r a c t s ,  a s  w e l l  a s  t h e  r o l e  o f  v e r t i c a l  a n d  
horizontal integration and the optimal allocation of property rights in 
minimizing enforcement costs.  
However, one of the major weaknesses of this approach has been that of 
neglecting a fundamental interdependence that could occur between the 
contract and the level of competition, at least in those institutional settings 
in which, contrary to the perfect competition ideal-type, parties may 
influence the emergence and the structuring of market equilibria. 
 
Referring to a ‘transaction à la Commons, we can shift from the traditional 
paradigm of bilateral transaction as the unit of analysis towards a more 
complex notion of transaction in which market dynamics (which we will 
analyze by the notion of employability) are explicitly taken into account 
(Nicita and Vatiero, 2007b).  
We will use this theoretical approach denoting as seller(s) (of spare time) the 
worker(s) and as buyer(s) the employer(s). In such a transaction, we will 
investigate the contractual dynamics between one seller and her 
counterparty (namely, one buyer), and we distinguish them from the market 
dynamics deriving from taking into account potential buyers and potential sellers.  
                                                 
5 In this respect, Williamson (1997:3) argues that the Coase Theorem is in essence a partial 
equilibrium analysis.   4






2. Improving employment and ‘employability’ 
 
For the time being, let’s start from two aspects of the concept of liberty as 
showed by Sen (1992; 2002).  
The first aspect of liberty is concerned with the possibility to achieve, rather 
than with the process through which that achievement comes about: in this 
meaning, “more freedom gives us more opportunity to achieve those things 
that we value, and have reason to value” (Sen, 2002:585). The second one 
concerns the process through which those things happen. In this second 
meaning, for example, “the procedure of free decision by the person himself 
(no matter how successful the person is in getting what he would like to 
achieve) is an important requirement of freedom” (Sen, 2002:585).  
Thus, process is concerned with what we manage to accomplish while 
opportunity with the real alternatives that we have to accomplish what we 
value (Sen, 1992).  
However, as Sen notes, the recognition of this distinction does not rule out 
the existence of overlaps between the two aspects. For example, 
 
“if a person values achieving something through free choice (and not 
through the end-product being delivered to him by someone else), or 
through a fair process (for example, wanting to “win and election fairly”, 
rather than just achieving a “win” – no matter how), then the process aspect 
of freedom will have a direct bearing on the opportunity aspect, as well”.  
Sen, 2002:586 
 
Therefore, “[i]n making a distinction between two aspects of freedom, there 
is no presumption that these are disjoint concerns, with no 
interdependence” (Sen, 2002:586).  
Indeed, we can draw a circular causation trajectory between opportunities 
and procedures.  
 
Commons (1924:111) offers the same distinction. Liberty is the absence of   5
restraints, while freedom is participation in government. In this respect, 
liberty is the negative removal of outside compulsions, while freedom is 
positive provision of accessible alternatives. Then, these produce two 
different results; if the slave is given the ‘liberty’ it signifies merely a negative 
limit on the former right to the master. But it does not determine the ex-
slave’s positive participation in all the possible transactions necessary to 
exercise his liberty. In other words, he could not gain the freedom of choice 
needed to complete his liberty. “In place of his former obedience to 
commands he gains only choiceless alternatives, and may be coerced to 
return to his master” (Commons, 1924:120).  
  
We can illustrate this distinction by a game-theoretical framework. Senian 
liberty of opportunities or Commonsian freedom represents the type and 
number of counterparties versus which one agent could ‘play’. Instead, 
Senian liberty of process or Commonsian liberty defines the rules of each 
game, i.e. the strategy set and the payoff function. 
In other words, in a Commonsian transaction Senian liberty of process or 
Commonsian liberty concerns the legal relationship between one seller and 
her buyer. Namely, given a bilateral relationship, in which modes this 
relationship is legally ruled. In our work, we will focus on inalienable norms6 
which set minima. For minima we mean the regulation of individual 
employment relationship by setting minimum wages, maximum working 
hours, basic health and safety standards, and so forth. It is normal for these 
tools to take the form of a “floor of rights” or set of minimum provisions 
on which other conventional sources of terms and conditions can improve, 
but from which they may not deviate from, except under prescribed 
conditions (Wedderburn, 1992). Among minima we study minimum wage.  
Instead, Senian liberty of opportunities or Commonsian freedom concerns 
the legal relationship between one seller and her alternative buyers. Namely, 
when opportunity costs are positive, what is the amount of switching costs? 
For our purposes, it regards the ability of an economic system to provide 
workers with exit (and entry) options (namely outside options), in order to 
allow them to switch from one labour relationship to another one. 
Consistently, Commons defines employability as the possibility of men (or 
women), who are willing and able to work, to find employment (Commons 
                                                 
6 As argued by Del Punta (2002) and Ichino (2004) the relation between Labour Law and 
Economics can be the opportunity for a reappraisal of unalienable labour law provisions.    6
and Andrews, 1936). This implies that an improving of employability 
determines an increasing of outside options.  
 
Thus, in order to balance7 the employee-employer relationship labour law 
can act in two ways. On one hand it may extend the worker’s set of 
alternatives, namely improving employability. On the other hand, it may 






3. Minimum wage 
 
Minimum wage can be defined with words as ‘the living wage’ or ‘the 
necessary cost of proper living’. These words may seem evanescent but 
there are many commonly used indexes (i.e. on poverty, level of education, 
etc.) that can be combined in order to establish a good proxy of the cost of 
a normal living.  
In this respect, many elements should be considered in order to reach an 
adequate minimum wage.  
The first, denominated wage loss from unemployment, refers to  
 
“[w]hether or not a worker can secure steady employment in a given 
industry is the factor which determines whether the “living wage” prescribed 
in an award provides a “living income” throughout the year. Many low-paid 
industries whose wages rates are affected by minimum wage awards are 
notably irregular”  
Commons and Andrews, 1936:63  
 
Therefore, minimum wage should be really minimum in order to prevent 
irregular works.  
                                                 
7 Kahn-Freund (1938:18) writes: “[t]he main object of labour law has always been, and we 
venture to say will always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of 
bargaining power which is inherent in the employment relationship”.  
8 In this respect, during the Industrial Revolution, the primitive Labour Law developed 
Senian liberties of process because of the standardization of work did not make possible 
alternative conditions for workers.   7
A second element, profits of the business, concerns whether or not the financial 
condition of the industry should be taken in account. “Most often the 
problem comes up in connection with the struggling business which claims 
it cannot survive if its workers are paid a living wage” (Commons and 
Andrews, 1936:63). This can lead to exempt the industry or sector in crisis 
from paying the whole cost of maintenance of workers.  
Finally,  substandard workers, all minimum wage laws permit the fixing of 
suitable wages for young workers, apprentices and inexperienced workers. 
Summing up, an optimal minimum wage should be consistent with the 
normal living standard of the place where it is applied, and should prevent 
the emergence of irregular work and crisis of industries, and should be 




4. Public employment offices and unemployment compensation 
 
With economic development employer’s power is reduced in its manifestation, 
but not in its capacity. More recently, power of the employer rests on her 
lower difficulties in seeking a worker fitting her needs than the worker in 
seeking an appropriate job for his skills. A possible reason can be the fact 
that the employer ‘uses’ the labour market more often than the employee or 
that the employer has more resources for spending. As a result, labour law 
focuses its efforts on trying to offer tools and offices for reducing this 
asymmetry.  
In this respect, labour law may, on the one hand, improve the worker’s 
capacity “to sell himself” in the market and, on the other hand, safeguard a 
minimal outside option.  
 
Again, John Commons offers an illuminating study on these two issues. 
Remedies in order to improve employability, as noted by Commons and 
Andrews (1936), may deal with the following points. 
1)  Regulated private employment agencies; perhaps the commonest 
method of seeking to bring about proper distribution is by unsystematic (i.e. 
by relatives and/or friends) individual search. Another common method is 
through the advertising media (i.e. by newspaper). Finally, a more systematic 
mean is the private employment agency; however, these private bureaus can   8
involve many abuses by imposing  
 
“wages and conditions of work, exaction of extortionate fees, sending 
applicants to immoral resorts, and “splitting fees” with foremen and this 
inducing frequent discharges in order to get fees from men employed to fill 
the vacancies”.  
Commons and Andrews, 1936:7  
 
Therefore, a restrictive legislation should prevent fraud and extortion.  
2)  Public employment offices;  
 
“[t]he agitation for public employment offices has been due partly to the 
search for a remedy for the abuses of private agencies and partly to a 
deepening conviction that it is a proper function of the state to help the 
unemployed find work”.  
Commons and Andrews, 1936:12 
  
3)  Systematic distribution of public work;  
 
“[a] well-developed system of employment offices cannot, of course, create 
jobs; but in addition to bringing the jobless workers quickly and smoothly in 
contact with such opportunities as exist, it can register the rise and fall in the 
demand for labor. This knowledge would make possible intelligent action 
for the prevention and relief of unemployment through the systematic 
distribution of public work and the pushing of necessary project when 
private industry’s demand for labor is at low level”.  
Commons and Andrews, 1936:27 
  
4)  Regularization of industry; that is, to reduce, or better to adjust, the 
economic fluctuations, in order to preserve the employer-employee 
relationship as more as possible. 
5)  Social insurance; that is, “settled policy of cooperative action to 
distribute among a group the losses suffered by individuals arising from 
their inability to work and thereby earn a livelihood” (Commons and 
Andrews, 1936:225).  
 
In particular, besides the normal activity of mediation between demand and 
supply (point 2), the role of public employment bureaus is relevant; it is 
significant because only by an effective performance, public employment   9
bureaus9 can compete with the services provided by private employment 
bureaus and reduce possible abuses of private employment bureaus (point 
1). Moreover public employment bureaus can furnish excellent information 
to the policy-maker when deciding a project of development (point 3). In 
addition, the relevance of point 4) is weakened with respect to that 
experienced in the period in which Commons’ wrote; the monetaristic 
Restoration tended to separate the activities of the central bank from those 
of the government and then the combination of monetary and fiscal policy 
– which is the main mean for adjusting the economic fluctuations – has 
diminished in strength. As a result, the role of public employment bureaus is 
again more relevant in absence (or weakness) of effective adjusting of 
economic fluctuations.      
 
Point 5 concerns the wider issue of social security10. Mostly social security in 
labour law is related to forms of unemployment11 compensation.  
                                                 
9 The situation of Italian public employment bureaus may be emblematic. The 80% of 
Italian unemployed are located in those regions where 75% of public employment bureaus 
are judged insufficient by the investigation of Isfol. Moreover, pc endowment is 
unsatisfactory and the internet cable and access is limited at only 50% of all public 
employment bureaus (see comment of Boeri 2002:33 on ISFOL report). This may explain 
the lack of adequate condition to fulfil their institutional task.  
10 On this point, Hayek (1944:89) writes:  
 
“[i]t will be well to contrast at the outset the two kinds of security: the limited one, which 
can be achieved for all, and which is therefore no privilege but a legitimate object of desire ; 
and the absolute security which in a free society cannot be achieved for all and which ought 
not to be given as a privilege – except in a few special instances such as that of the judges, 
where complete independence is of paramount importance. These two kinds of security are, 
first, security against severe physical privation, the certainty of a given minimum of 
sustenance for all ; and, secondly, the security of a given standard of life, or of the relative 
position which one person or group enjoys compared with others ; or, as we may put it 
briefly, the security of a minimum income and the security of the particular income a person 
is thought to deserve”. 
Hayek, 1944:89 
 
In other words, Hayek distinguishes “the security which can be provided for all outside of 
and supplementary to the market system, and the security which can be provided only for 
some and only by controlling or abolishing the market” (Hayek, 1944:89). Surely, we 
prefer the first kind of security. 
11 Unemployment is a problem not only for the losses in wages and the resulting distress, 
but also (and equally) for the loss in the “weakening of morale which comes with   10
We can distinguish two forms of unemployment compensation: the Ghent 
System and compulsory unemployment insurance. In the former 
unemployment insurance is originated among labor organizations.  
 
“In order to encourage insurance, a plan was devised by which 
governments, most often municipal, granted subsidies to trade unions 
furnishing unemployment insurance. This is the principle of the famous 
Ghent System, which was first introduced in the city of Ghent in Belgium 
in 1901. The Ghent idea was rapidly adopted [in many European country 
(and also in Italy)] […] before the World War”.  
Commons and Andrews, 1936:203-4  
 
This system stimulates provision against unemployment (see, Gibbon, 
1911:104-5), but failed in order to  
 
“attract a sufficiently large number of workers […] [Moreover] [t]he 
exemption of employers from any direct share in the cost of insurance, 
with the consequent loss of a valuable stimulus to unemployment 
prevention, is another serious disadvantage of voluntary subsidized 
scheme”  
Commons and Andrews, 1936:294  
 
Instead, the compulsory unemployment insurance is based on the fact that 
the employer, the employee, and the government all contribute to the 
insurance fund (Commons and Andrews, 1936:295). Unemployment 
insurance must be a pro-tempore subsidy, and, therefore, employee, 
employer and government must “invest resources” in order to re-create a 
                                                                                                                                  
uncertainty […] Unemployment is a culture bed for pauperism and all of its accompanying 
evils”11 (Commons and Andrews, 1936:3). And again: 
  
“[b]esides the losses to the worker and his family, there are other costs of unemployment 
affecting both employer and the entire community […] Unemployment and fear of 
unemployment, moreover, impair the efficiency of workmen; and labor turnover, requiring 
the hiring and “breaking in” of new employees, has been shown to be expensive to the 
employer […] From the public point of view, unemployment represent a vast waste of 
productive capacity and, more directly, places a heavy burden upon public and private 
charity. It is one of the chief causes of destitution and often leads to crime”. 
Commons and Andrews, 1936:4 (italic is added)   11
new labour relationship12. But, what we want to emphasize at this point is 
that the so-called Ghent experiment can be run along with the compulsory 
scheme; in this way we can involve trade unions (along with the employer 
unions) in safeguard of unemployed workers in a more significant way.  
Undoubtedly, unemployment compensation resources are saved when 
employability runs in an effective manner.  
 
 
5. Re-assessing and concluding remarks 
 
We use the notion of transaction as originally introduced by John R. 
Commons in order to render more accurate the analysis of employer-
employee relationships. Indeed, such transaction allows us to distinguish 
between employment and employability improving. The former regards 
legislative intervention for regulating surplus sharing process, while the latter 
can be interpreted as a set of legal tools for which a minimal outside option 
is granted and worker’s capacity to choose is widened.  
 
In our work the former is represented by the minimum wage, while the 
latter can be made possible by an effective system of public employment 
offices and employment compensations. 
In particular, an optimal minimum wage should be consistent with the 
normal living standard of the place where it is applied. Moreover it should 
prevent the emergence of irregular work and crisis of industries, and should 
be discerned for age and skill. An effective employability, instead, rests 
essentially on efficient public employment offices and on a coherent system 
of social security, in which minimum wage – properly set – is the most 
important component. 
 
In this way we guess to fulfil D’Antona’s (1999:22-3) request of more active 
workers’ safeguards labour law before the stipulation of the labour contract. 
Therefore, the purpose should be a wider13 – although less deep – labour 
law.   
                                                 
12 On this point the best model in our opinion is the mechanism of welfare as 
implemented by the so-called Danish ‘flexicurity’ where active policies effectively 
stimulate the entry or re-entry of workers in a labour relationship. 
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